editor at the hill a look at what to expect in the week coming up before congress departs for the july hth recess. and the senior associate of the middle east program at the carnegie endowment for international peace and he will be talking about the results of the recent iranian election. thank you for joining us for this edition of the "washington journal" and we'll we'll see you again tomorrow morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern time. >> today on c-span, robert mueller testifies on nsa surveillance program. in-house debate on a bill banning late-term abortions

after 20 weeks. load five barbara boxer and patty murray responding to the health debate and vote. now robert mueller testifies on the national security agency surveillance programs and how it aids his agency on national security issues. this was his last agile to appearance before the senate judiciary committee. when he sets down in september, he will be the second largest serving fbi director in history. this hearing is about 2.5 hours.

>> good morning. toda today, the judiciary committee welcomes robert mueller for what

is likely to be his final appearance before this panel as director of the federal bureau of investigation (fbi). director mueller began as head of the fbi just days before the terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001. for nearly 12 years, he has led the bureau as it has shifted its primary focus to national security and counterterrorism efforts, while still carrying on its historic mission of fighting crime. that transition, while important for our national security, has not been without problems. from national security letters

to the latest revelations about the use of the patriot act, i remain concerned that we have not yet struck the right balance between the intelligence- gathering needs of the fbi, and the civil liberties and privacy rights of americans. i also want to make sure that the shift in the fbi's focus does not unduly hamper the bureau's ability to investigate cases involving fraud and violent crime that significantly affect the everyday lives of americans. i have never questioned the integrity, dedication, and consummate professionalism of director mueller, as he has led the bureau through very difficult times. he has been a steady and determined leader of the fbi. he has spoken forcefully about the need to protect americans'

civil liberties, it was no surprise that a committed public servant like bob mueller would agree to put his long-awaited vacation and travel plans on hold, so that he could continue to serve his country in this intensely demanding position, when the president asked him to stay on heard two years ago. has devoted his entire life to public service, and we ar and we are grateful to him and his family for their continued sacrifice.i might mention in this regard, director mueller will be leaving the next , your wife, i know i should put up with through the absences.

you have a wonderful family. i've had the privilege of meeting them. anne howou will tell in much i appreciate what she has done. leaving enormous shoes to fill. as the fbi now prepares for its first change in leadership since the 9/11 attacks, we must continue to review closely the broad intelligence-gathering powers that congress granted to the fbi has faced daunting national security challenges, but we must also ensure that they do not violate the privacy rights and civil liberties of law-abiding americans. i have long said that protecting national security and protecting americans' fundamental rights are not mutually exclusive. we can and must do both. the recent public revelations about two classified data collection programs illustrate

the need for close scrutiny by congress of the government's surveillance activities. for years, i have been troubled by the expansive nature of the usa patriot act. these powerful law enforcement tools, including section 215 orders, require careful monitoring and close oversight. that is why i authored legislation in 2009 that would have improved and reformed the patriot act, while increasing public accountability and transparency. my bill was reported by this committee on a bipartisan basis in 2009 and 2011, and would help protect the privacy rights ofof innocent americans. i intend to re-introduce that bill tomorrow, and hope that senators from both parties will join me in this effort to improve the patriot act and further protect the civil liberties of everyday citizens. the american people deserve to know how broad investigative laws like the patriot act are being interpreted and used to conduct electronic surveillance, surveillance.

the american people also deserve to know whether these programs have proven sufficiently effective to justify their breadth. right now, i remain skeptical. i also firmly believe that we need to maintain close oversight over the broad surveillance authorities contained in the fisa amendments act.i have had concerns about section 702, despite its statutory focus on foreigners overseas. that is why i pushed for a shorter sunset, greater transparency and better oversight last year when congress considered reauthorizing these provisions.i regret the senate rejected my efforts. we have to have an open debate about the efficacy of these tools, particularly in light of the boston marathon bombing in

april. we must carefully examine not only the tools that allow the government to collect information, but also what we do with that information. intelligence obtained by the fbi may not have been properly relayed through the joint terrorism task force to the boston police department. this cannot come at the expense of the law enforcement efforts. the limoneira data shows in 2012 the overall violent crime rate in the u.s. rose for the first time since 2006. i think we should look at why it is the fbi able to work with their state and local partners. i also know that the fbi has been at the forefront in using forensic science in its

investigations. it has had problems with its crime lab. i look forward to working with the fbi to develop comprehensive legislation to address forensic matters. i thank director mueller forfor being here. i also think the hard-working men and women of the at the i. i know you are proud to serve with them. i look forward to your testimony. >> thank you for your service as well. you arending that time willing to serve the people of this country. thank you chairman leahy for calling the hearing. i welcome director mueller back, particularly because this is likely to be the last hearing he will appear before. over the last 12 years, he has done a good job of transforming fbi into a national

security agency, the wall between intelligence and criminal cases has come down in the integration of law- enforcement and intelligence. those fundamental changes have more successful in stopping terrorist attacks before they act her. they have felt strengthened the -- whenbi when of it tried it -- when tragic event like the boston bombing occurred. state and local law enforcement has been improved. there's still problems with the at the ipo needs to be addressed. , i think director mueller for his service. i'm sure he is looking or word to this time off. unfortunately, we still do not

know you will be replacing him when he leaves. and is very concerning raises questions about the upcoming transition. for starters, the resident has submitted a nominee. there have been media reports that the president intends to nominate james coney, former deputy attorney general of the bush administration but no official nomination has been received. it is unclear what the intention of the white house is with the release of his possible nomination. it does not change the fact that the president has not there.y we will not have enough time to properly vet the nominee.

there is a delay in him pointing this and fast bureaucracy will an acting in dash to director. i would like to hear from richter mueller about the transition planning, how he intends to hand things over. there are other matters to discuss first. there has been a lot of news about the classified leaks. the 7024rmation was intelligence and has darted a debate about whether these programs strike the proper balance between civil liberties and our security.

they chose to release additional details explaining how they operate and the facts surrounding successes in thwarting terrorist attacks. it details a very a safeguard theprogram oversight in program. i am always of the opinion that more oversight is needed. congress needs to be extra vigilant in conducting oversight of these programs. was aday's public hearing good opportunity for congress to show the american people that these programs can be discussed in an open manner. people better understand how the program works. this includes the necessary declassification of information

to assist congress in determining whether the law was followed. the american people will not and are stan how their government works. there is a seeker surrounding the administration. they legislated and spite of civil liberties. that thehe only way american people will have confidence in what their government is doing. i continue to believe a major problem causing the leaking of classified information is the back of whistleblower information. the final information of the actor that was signed into law last year failed to include protections for the intelligence committee.

this would have provided a method for employees to report concerns to protect channel with in the immunity. i believe the existence of such a channel would help stop would be leakers from releasing classified information. i would like to hear about whether he would support such a provision. , the cynicue continues to address the topic in various entities. they all recognize a need to strengthen the cybersecurity defenses. the difference is how to do it. the director may inform us about what barriers exist.

and they are preventing efforts to prevent cyber attacks. regarding conditional -- traditional threats, i remember cases where individuals may have been convicted based on faulty at the i crime lab reports. withnt a number of letters the 99 review. today we have not received a briefing on this. they tend to focus on the post review. i would like to hear what the direct or says about the matter and what has been done to bring justice to defendants that may be innocent as a result of faulty lab work. about ask the director

on fbi's plans for using man aerial systems or drones at the last oversight hearing. unmanned systems or drones. he indicated dea and atf had purchased drones and were exploring their use in law enforcement. from this response was an indication of how the f ei -- fbi was seeking to use joan technology. i will ask him whether the fbi is considering purchasing drones and what limitations they have put in place. i will ask about the murder. it has been 2.5 years. has cited the ongoing

investigation as a reason for not providing information. at some point they will have to answer questions about this matter. it is a matter of humanity to do that. i remain concerned that whistleblowers continue to face retaliation. i will ask the director about the final outcome of to whistle player -- blower cases. this has blown the whistle. the second is robert colbert is who blew the whistle on time and attendance fraud at the new york city field office. the deputy attorney general found special agent turner was

subject to personnel action. appealedhe f -- fbi the case for nearly a decade? what action was taken against those persons who participated in a retaliation? the current status of that case and if there has been a ruling, why has my office not been provided a copy? thank you very much for your service and also for helping me get to the bottom of some of these things. >> thank you very much. director mueller, we will of inrse put your statements the record. it will probably be your last appearance here. you're only the sick structure of the federal bureau of investigation.

th structure of the federal bureau of investigation. you were a marine in vietnam through to the present. the floor is yours. thank you. thank you for the kind comments about my wife who deserves very much of the credit. we appreciate the thinking of her. thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the win and women of the fbi. thank you for your support of the institution over the last 11 years.

any progress we have made in that timeframe is this retail -- a treatable to a number of entities, one thing this committee. we live in a time of persistent threats from cyber criminals and five. we face a wide range of criminal threat from white collar crime to child predators. we must evolve to counter these threats. even doing a time of constrained budgets. i would like to highlight several of the highest priorities and criminal threats. starting with terrorism. the terror threat against the united states must remain our top priority. we face a continuing threat from homegrown violent extremists. these individuals present

unique challenges. they do not share a typical profile. their experiences and motives are often distinct which makes them difficult to identify and to stop. at the same time, foreign terrorists still seek to strike at home and abroad. the operate in more places and against a wider array of targets than they did a decade ago. inhave seen an increase cooperation among terrorist groups and in evolution in the attack looks and communications. weaker, itoxide is remains committed to attacks against the west. al qaeda affiliates and surrogates pose a persistent threats. in light of recent attacks, we must focus on emerging extremist groups care -- capable of carrying out such attacks.

turning briefly to that which was mentioned, ciber. the cyber threat has evolved significantly over the past decades. criminals have become increasingly adept at exploiting weaknesses in our computer networks. once inside they can take the trade secrets. we face persistent threats from hackers for profit. tivistat we call a hack groups. i believe the cyber threat may it could be terrorist threat in years to come. we are strengthening our cyber capabilities the same way we enhanced our intelligence and national security capabilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. we are focused on intrusions and network attacks. they work side-by-side with agile and local counterparts on

cyber task forces. we have increased the size of the joint task force which brings together nine teen law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to stop current attacks and prevent future attacks. federal crime requires a global approach. we are sharing information and coordinating investigations with our counterparts. on this particular point, we recognize the dirt is an .ssential partner we have established several noteworthy outreach programs but we must do more. we need to shift to a model of true collaboration and in the private sector. turning to the criminal programs, we have a great range

of responsibilities from white collar fraud to transnational criminal enterprises and violent crime to public corruption. we must focus on those areas where we bring something unique to the table. gangent crime and gaine communities put a toll. the bureau remained vigilant to fine and soft shot predators. our mission is threefold. first to decrease the vulnerability of children to exploitation. to provide a rapid response to crimes against children. to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement through task force issues. second ande for a spend a moment discussing the

recent public disclosure of highly classified national security programs. the highest priority of the intelligence community is to our nationals to security. we do so in full compliance of the law. public expects the intelligence community to protect privacy interests even as the muska and ducked our mission. the court has approved both programs. even as we conduct our mission. the court has approved road programs. the programs have been carried out with extensive oversight inm the court from congress independent inspectors general. these programs do remain classified. i know there have been classified briefings on these programs over the last couple of weeks.

toope most of you are able attend. if you were unable to, i would suggest that -- suggest and encourage you to do so. as to the person who has admitted to making these disclosures, he is the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation. these disclosures have caused significant harm to our safety. we are taking on set to hold accountable the verse responsible for these disclosures. actively under investigation i cannot comment publicly on any of the details of the investigation. in closing, i like to turn to sequestration. the impact of sequestration on the ability to protect the nation from terrorism and crime will be significant. fiscal year 2013 the budget was cut by more than 500 $50 million due to sequestration. 2015 they will

total more than 700 million dollars. the ongoing hiring freeze will make 200 vacancies at the fbi by the end of this year. and you have said that the bureau's greatest asset are our people. additional cuts will impact our ability as an organization to bourbon crime and terrorism which will impact the safety and security of our nation. a understand the need for bunch of reductions. we are going through a thorough review of every dollar spent. i am sure we can find savings. i would like to work with the committee to work on the significant impacts of the cuts. members of the committee, i

would like to thank you on behalf of the bureau and all of our people for your support of the f ei and its mission. our transformation over the past decade would not have been possible without your to operation. i think you personally. thank you for your efforts and your contributions. i look forward to answering any questions you might have. >> thank you very much. i concern about sequestration. beenpproach has devastating the law enforcement and it has been devastating to the critical work we do in seeking cures for major diseases and a number of areas that has put our scientific efforts behind some of these countries.

let me talk about the authorities. concerns about section 215 of the patriot act. the director of national intelligence is declassified, some more information about the -- the bulk. i think the american people want to know if it has been sufficiently effective to justify what is a very expansive scope. last week i asked the direct or of the national security administration to provide about casesormation where data obtained through

section 215 proved critical. he promised he would provide that by now. he has not yet. i assume that having problems publicly he will. his 50.k we heard seemed clear the majority of the cases were not under section 215. 702.s section a different type of program. have own records obtained through section 215 been critical to thie disruption of terrorist threats? if so, how many times? >> yes. would say for most of the locations it has been a , one.buting factor

amongst a number of dots. there are those cases where it has been instrumental. the one that was mentioned yesterday was an individual out of san diego who we had opened in 2000 and three. -- 2003. this individual was involved shabbab shabbat -- al in somalia. the initial was from a tip. >> we close it down in 2003. nsa was on a telephone line in east africa. they had a number of the line but they did not tell what calls were made to the telephone line in east africa. once equipment, they took the

number and ran it against the database and came up with this number in san diego. all they had was a number. they then went through the legal process to get the subscriber information that is not included in the database. then they went up on this after they gained the requisite predication. initially.e case that person has been did and pled guilty and is about to be sentenced. that is one case for you had to 15 standing by itself. >> is impossible to say how many has been critical? we talked about billions of phone numbers. >> levy if i could say two things. we are working through the nest of numbers, cases. of those there will be anywhere from 10 or 12 where 215 was important. >> out of the billions of phone numbers. >> yes. let me go back to september 11.

he was one of the principal hijackers ultimately. -- onein the plane that of the planes in new york. he was a principal hijackers. the intelligence agencies were on him, tracking him through the far east. nobody had him in the united states. sometime thereafter, the intelligence communities are on a number in yemen that is known to be affiliated with terrorist s. withoutpoint in time this particular capability, they had no way of identifying whether there was somebody in san diego, and this number in yemen. had we had this information we well may have been able to stop

the attacks. if we had this program in place then, the nsa would bring the number two us. we would run it against the database. what would come up is his number in san diego and we would go exactly the same routine. >> you also have other things. the 9/11 commission showed begun shared the cia and fbi information. they created problem's. s. problem ofnesota had the warnings asia out there. it followed up in washington. we can look at a whole lot of things that i assume will be doing a lot better.

i realize the mistakes made before 9/11, we are trying to close that. i was concerned about the testimony last week by the nsa, as though they were conflating 215 and 702 as though this was critical to everything. yet you collected several billion phone calls. sometimes you do not have anything. you just have good police work. it makes you look back and find

out what numbers are worthwhile. imbued that we get so with the technology that we forget somehow all the technology in the world is not help as much as just collecting the dots. -- connecting the dots. >> what concerns me is you never know what. is going to be key. you want as many dots as you can. , you areose as many moving dots from the playing field. the decision that it is not worth it. let there be no mistake here it to connect ifs you do not have the ability to go back in a records that retains the toll records.

>> i have further questions. we have heard conflicting testimony that on the boston that evenombing though the boston police have four officers aside they were not given all the information the fbi had about the -- what the russian security service had. cryptic though it might be. we were not told that he intended to travel abroad. is that true? >> yes and no. let me if i can explain. .t is a pleasant task force

the task force last year had probably close to 1000 threats related to counterterrorism. everybody on that task for scandals local threats and is -- that handles local threat is a task force. should the hierarchy of the boston police department be informed? because this was resolved, it they did not get briefed up through the task force. otheress the participants in the task force. i do not think it is fair to criticize the task force concept if not for something like this doing briefings higher up the chain of command. i will tell you that if you talk to state and local law enforcement. the work we have done was first rate. the relationships we have developed our extensive.

and the success of bringing and identifying those who are responsible is attributable to that work. byis also contributed to us the relationship. >> thank you very much. i apologize. please go ahead. not just told him he does need to apologize. he is chairman of the committee. in maythe last hearing 2000 12, senator hatch asked a question as to whether or not president obama discussed potential successors with you. you responded that he had not in the past -- that he had in the past but not recently. any not expect to get information on the content of a discussion you might have with the president. i do as this question. since the hearing, have you

discussed potential successors with president obama? >> yes. i generally do not like to get in the conversation. >> you have answered the question. do you have a transition place -- in place for your successor and how much time is needed to implement it to provide a seamless transition? >> we have been preparing for the last 2.5 years. we have already prepared the extensive materials at the successor will have to review. we are prepared to start the briefings as soon as the person is sworn in. we have been looking at personnel so that there can be some overlap of personnel so if the person comes in and has key components that are ready to support them in the same way i came in the fbi supported me. >> approximately how many -- mike's -- much time as

necessary? experience.earning we will get the briefings but a month to gete one's feet on the ground. in that month, something is going to happen so what ever you plant in terms of sitting down and looking at something, something else will come up and your tension will be diverted. >> this is so important. we will have four weeks in july. we will have only four days after your term ends to consider a nominee. do you have any idea when we might expect a nominee to come up from the white house? >> i do but i'm not in the position to say. >> let me go onto another one. this involves fast and furious. in my opening statement, i said i know that the fbi does not talk about ongoing investigations. eventually, the fbi has to talk

about the murder investigation just like eventually you had to talk about the anthrax investigation. i am going to be submitting a detailed list of questions about the concerned that the family has, that there was an attempt to cover up the connection between the guns and the atf operation. the indications of an attempted cover-up have not been fully investigated. told you be able to respond my ring questions before you leave office? it. would have to look at we will make every effort to do so. in regard to this issue, on i will ask 20th 2011 what time they arrived.

to believe there there is any truth to this? >> i do not believe there is any truth. i would have to go back and make certain. i do not believe there's is any truth that i would like to go back and make certain that we have nothing that would be supportive. >> i would like to have that in writing. i want to go to drones and recent responses to attorney general holder following his last oversight hearing. the department of justice advised the committee that both the dea and atf have acquired unmanned aircraft systems. they wereated that drawing up plans and procedures to use them.

does the fbi currently use of drones? if so, for what purpose? >> yes. for surveillance. fbi had any agreement with other agencies? cod and homeland security? to receive assistance in the use of drones. >> i do not think so. ,ne of the issues with drones the use of drones by any inncies is what happened the air space. there will be some communication back and forth. >> incident asking me a question, i think i can assume -- instead of asking a question, i think i can assume that they have a valid set of policies on

the use of drones and whether or not any privacy impacts american citizens. >> we are in the initial stages of doing that. our footprint is very small. we have very few of limited use. we are exploring not only the use but also the necessary guidelines for that use. use drones for surveillance on u.s. soil? >> yes. let me just put it in context. very minimal. very seldom. a crime to purchase materials for the urges of toegal passports -- distribute illegal passports and to engage in other activities that facilitate trafficking of false passports.

the immigration bill before the senate will weaken this current law. under the bill, only those who distribute three or more passports will have committed a crime. only those who possess or use three or more passports will have committed a crime. even more outrageous, only those who use any unofficial material to make 10 or more passports will have committed a crime. will these changes in current law have a negative impact on counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts of the fbi? >> i am not familiar with the current law. even less so with the proposed law. i would have to get back to you on that particular question. >> it would be very important that you get back to it.

let me look at it. i will try to get back to you in short order. >> would you agree that the weakening of current law creates a loophole that could allow terrorist groups such as al qaeda or hezbollah or other to more easily operate within the united states? >> without analyzing the bill, i am not in a position to apply -- to comment on it. >> i will yield. >> he made several marks -- remarks about the man before us. i do not know how may times i had seen one person at this very long table.

, i first meeter i was-- met you when mayor and your united states attorney. i have watched your progress. i have watched you served two , one republican, when democrats. i have watched your extraordinary integrity. remove thehed you fbi from certain interrogation having to do with detainees. i consider you to be a man of high integrity and very strong values. you brought that also and strengthens in the organization you represent. i think everyone is very sad to see you go. you look young and vital to me. .> i feel that way, too >> i want to have a talk with you about these two programs.

i go front and center with them as chair of the intelligence committee. theave tried to provide oversight and see that they follow law. we had a classified briefing. i will say one thing about it. we have the former chief judge of the foreign intelligence surveillance court there to explain how the court proceeds. i believe both these programs are illegal, that they are carefully overseen. senator leahy mentioned the one ,hat collects the record data not the names, but the data, not the content, but the data. only 22 people have access to it. it was queried approximately 300 times. you mentioned that it was responsible and helped in 10%

or 12% of the 50 cases where the nsa has said it was helpful. for aking you now qualitative judgment. i have made mine. ?ow do you judge the 10% to 12% highly worth it or not worth it? it is very difficult to judge a program in that part killer way, particularly a program that will give you a key to preventing a terrorist attack. one need you have, how can you differentiate that from five or six others that may come up in the same place? which will be the one to help you disrupt the plot? in my mind, the communications capabilities of terrorist's is the weakest link. we are to prevent terrorist be in thee have to

communications. having the ability to identify a person in the united states, one may preventmber that one attack, that boston or that 9/11. yes it is relevant evidence. yes it is critically important that we have that means. when you have these vast volumes, how do you properly get oversight at the justice department and the national security division and the inspector general's office. ? everybody wants to look at these and make sure they are legal and affect the and appropriate oversight. he does raise national security and civil liberties concerns. once you identify it, are you going to take it... the table

and make them unavailable to you? that is a question for congress. washe way i looked at it that this was an attack which could have killed hundreds if not thousands of people. to be awas not going lone perpetrator. there were at least two conspiratorial that would purchase a patent. we know about other things that would show there would be more people. it seems to me if we were not able to protect it and the new york subway were blown up in a number of different places with hundreds of people is really being killed, that there would be no question as to its value. i have come to believe that the only way we prevent these

attacks is good intelligence. how do you get good intelligence when likely one of the conspirators is in another country connected with a terrorist group? one is in this country prepared to carry it out. to needy value of these programs and preventing loss of life in this country -- to meet the value of these programs and of life in thisof thi country, is important. do you think it would be possible to not collect a database but be able to quay area of the database if the time for keeping database was extended to five years? i know they are looking at the possibility of restructuring the program in this way. there are two disadvantages. first of all, there is no record retention requirements of

telephone companies. they are all over the lot. some may do it 18 months. some may be less or more. in that database will be those calling the are numbers. if you have a number in yemen, that would require you to go to three or five or six particular carriers with separate legal papers and required then to come and pick up what they have collected and are keeping their and get back to you. it would take an awfully long time. when you're trying to prevent terrorist attacks you want that information as to whether or not they number in yemen is in contact with someone in the united states almost instantaneously seek to prevent that attack. you cannot wait three or six .onths or a year those are the continents i have about an alternative way of handling this.

about anncerns i have alternative way of handling this. >> is it 10 or 12 cases or percent? >> 10 or 12 cases. all of sure whether them are 215. they are combination or one or the other. >> one other quick question. if people are concerned about privacy, i think the greatest threat to the privacy of americans is the drone and the use of the drone and the very few regulations that are on it today. the booming industry of commercial drones. you mentioned you use it for surveillance. what are the privacy strictures on the use of drones by your agency today? >> it is very seldom used and used in a particular incident .here you need the capability

i would have to go back and check in terms of what we keep and what -- in terms of the images. it is on particular i need an cases. limitation.ivacy >> i would like to get that information. i think it would be help old to us. thank you very much. senator hatch. >> thank you so much. i came here today to basically thank you for your service. i also want to thank senator feinstein for her kind remarks about you. senator feinstein has done and i clench on the intelligence committee. an amazing job on the intelligence committee. i am aware of these matters. all i can say is you want to pay

tribute to you and others in the intelligence community and the fbi for the work that you have done to protect our country in clearing out these problems that really could have been very disastrous had we not had the abilities that you have been describing here today. i also want to personally thank you for the terrific service you have given. have watched you very carefully. i've been chairman and ranking member on this committee. i do not know that we have ever had and fbi director to as good as you are. frankly, everyone of us has confidence in in you and your ability and your integrity. you and your ability and your integrity. we mean that very sincerely. fbi do the job

that in many ways they never get thanked for. people do not even know about it. it is a thankless job and you have given almost 12 years of your life to this type of work. i'd want to tell you how much a personally appreciate you. i appreciate the fbi and those to have served all these years. i wish to the very best when you andlly do hang them up here all of us -- i think i can speak for most all of us, we just think you are terrific. i will not take any more time but i just want to make you shudder -- make sure you know doing a greate job. >> thank you, you shared my confirmation hearing and i will not forget that. i have been fortunate to have the opportunity to do this job.

thank you for those comments. >> you have done a great job. >> thank you very much. senator frank and is not here. senator sessions? those were kind comments. i would echo them. you know my admiration for you as a professional is exceedingly high. you came to the office with the kind of skills and experiences that others have noted that give you the opportunity to be very effective in this position. i salute you for that and your integrit. your integrity is undoubted.

there are so many things happening now. to rise to fbi needs the occasion. the fbi is such a premier investigative agency. i had the honor to prosecute cases brought to me by fbi agents for almost 15 years. i met with them personally for hours and weekends and nights and know how meticulously they work to do everything exactly right. ,hen i hear people have doubts sometimes, about the integrity of the average cases and agents i know, i know that is just not right. they tried to the right thing every day. if they are involved in anything the discipline, will fall swift upon them. they can make mistakes. congress sometimes create circumstances that puts them in

difficult positions. life is tough for agents out there. fundamentally, day after day, i worked with fbi as their personal friends. i it is want to share those thoughts. maybe you would like to comment on the fidelity of your agents. you're not going to find a better group of people to serve with. >> the testimony was firmly felt. when i was a person in the institution in the wake of september 11, every professional worked flawlessly in response to that. it is indicative of the capabilities of the organization and quality of the people. big matters before

the nation today is the irs scandal involving the actions that have been taken to target conservatives or tea party groups. i know that he testified before the house committee. housewifenormal american citizen. she get deeply engaged and to try to make her country better. she loves this country, her integrity is high. she was trying to do the right thing. i believe that the irs did not perform and handle their applications for status correctly i believe it is a very serious matter and. i am concerned about it. you asked as to whether or not the potential victims of these

abuses have been interviewed. i believe you said no. on may 14 attorney-general holder, the fbi said the the fbi then -- is lead agency of the irs? >> yes. >> and you designate agent of a charge of that investigation? >> yes, i have. >> and you asked before whether you needed names. thathave many -- i can say over a dozen agents have been assigned locally. at the allowable, but also we have people at headquarters that are monitoring it. i cannot tell you who, in the course of the investigation, has

been interviewed. i will tell you that before we invest the invest -- we before we begin the investigation, we to give those individuals before the even initiated an investigation. they would be the victims to which you mentioned. >> the fbi is the right agency in my opinion. you have the independence to the affectively. -- to do that effectively. said they have been talking pantser potential victims none of them have been interviewed, none of them have been contacted -- victims, none of them have been contacted by an interviewer.

what documents they had, what the basic parameters of the problems are, get busy on it. it seems to me you are running behind here. i am not familiar with the day- to-day teals -- day-to-day details. one of the first things you do as a prosecutor is have the records so when you do the interviews you have the requisite material so you can do an effective interview. >> i do not know what is level of whothe is be an interview. >> i think you need to get that level. i think it is too slow. you always have agents getting records together and someone

needs to go out and find a problem is. talk to the people and see what the problem is. >> it is not languishing. would share deep concern at , save forration bill passports, only those that produce and issue three or more passports have committed a crime. under the bill those that forge altar and possess three or more passports have committed a crime. only those that use any official material to make more passports have committed a crime. we like the fbi's advice if this makes it more difficult to produce integrity in the passport processing business. would you look at it? >> yes we will.

>> thank you very much mr. chairman. thank you for your wonderful service for the last 12 years. thank you for the work you have done in minnesota. i was riveted by the work that you did in your agents with boston. i noticed there were atf agents there so i will start with that. we just had a hearing for the president's nominee for the head of the atf. you think it would be helpful to have a permanent atf? been officialys for the agency to have a permanent head. >> very good. has this congress to confront anyone for the job? >> i understand @. >> one of the ideas put out -- at least president of

the united states of the top so we get a nominee, senator dorgan put the director of the atf under the fbi. what we think of that idea? >> that would require a great deal of study. somee want to embark on sort of murder. >> i believe we are at point that are at one to 700 agents -- that are at 2700 agents. i just wanted to put that out there for your people to think about. for confirmation ahead but if that does not happen with think of other ways to get this done. i appreciate that. there have been several questions on the nsa issue and i appreciated your comments earlier about supporting and declassifying -- working to do that. is that correct? >> what we were talking about

was the examples of either 215 or 702 and has been used. >> you think that could work? >> there was testimony in yesterday's hearing before the house. i would regard to that ongoing process. >> i appreciate that. i also appreciate the information that could show the number of terrorist attacks that numbered. can talk about the various checks through the process for data collection and analysis? people would understand it would protect privacy. >> certainly if you look at two

hundred 15 and you do have a , it does not have any information regarding who. just 22 persons who have access to this who run the numbers against the database. 20 analysts and two supervisors and last year there were only 300 inquiries made into that database. overlapping and -- the fisaof this court that re-- every government has the role in ensuring privacy is protected. you have a strong possibility of an action of a tea that in some cases this has been

.nstrumental -- >> to have had deaths in minnesota as well as many other states, huge calls to the poison control line. if we passed legislation a targeting certain of these synthetic directs. there's still more work to be done and working on the analog drug provision, i think we could do more with that. could you update us on the general state of synthetic drug use in the u.s. and if the provisions were passed last year were helpful and what we think we could do. >> i know it is on the increase. i am not familiar with the last part of your question as to what more we could do. particularlya, and in the time of budget constraints where we have to

prioritize, unfortunately trust on further on our list. but unfortunately it is further on our list. but wanted to put it on your radar screen. working on a bill in metal theft. i know you talked about the cyber crime issue and the city believes the fbi must change with evolving technology to address criminal and national security threats. what is the fbi currently doing to keep up with changes in technology? >> internally we understand that we have to have a basic knowledge of technology to conduct an investigation in this age, to the extent where you need to be refreshed on where we are in order to do our job. it is getting greater training.

we have more than 1000 personnel around the country that are specialists in this particular area. key for us is the ncijts, following the pattern of what we did after september 11, understanding we cannot do it alone and having a task force concept where you have all of the major players in the cyber arena participating so if there is a substantial intrusion we immediately would have those involved, the dhs, nsa, dod, they are trying to determine how to address it. we have put a great deal of focus on work with private industry, providing private information to private industry truck collided with the found -- to private industry up with what we found.

billy our capacity with the private sector have been in the areas we have been focusing on. >> thank you very much. thank you for your service. >> thank you, ma'am. >> thank you, senator. senator cruise? >> thank you, madam chairman. thank you for testifying. you and i have known each other for a dozen years -- for a long time. a dozen years ago you were my boss at the department of justice. any mistakes i have made, you will be fully held harmless. >> you were clean. >> let me also echo the comments of colleagues of mine on both sides of the aisle, thanking you for your service and your integrity. you have spent many decades in public service, focused on law enforcement. i recall when we were working together at the department of justice, almost every day the question you would ask is

essentially are we locking up bad guys? toppreciate that focused and protecting the innocent and going after bad guys. thank you for a lifetime of service. i want to talk about those topics that are both of significant importance. the first is the irs and i want to act as some of the concerns that senator sessions raised about the group that were targeted by the irs that are reporting that they have yet to be contacted or interviewed by the fbi. ny you know well in a investigation in a highly politicized climate that involves potentially corruption and political interference from , thehite house h

investigation and is an and perilous endeavor -- the investigation is a perilous endeavor. what would you describe the investigation at the fbi? >> it is a high priority investigation in that it needs to be handled with care. it also needs to be pushed aggressively because of a very important case. i think you are where we have worked together. i will pull no punches as to where the investigation will lead. down any path that would lead to evidence on individuals, organizations, or otherwise. we are in the process of doing that. we have substantial numbers in terms of those who are working day in and day out on the investigation, both internally

and the fbi. we also have support from the boss -- from the department of justice. i will have to get back with you read it to you with terms. -- i will have to get back to you with terms. i am aware of the ongoing investigation. believe we have moved expeditiously during the period of time we have had it open, which is about a month now. >> how many agents or other personnel -- >> we have told agents working on it here in the state. -- 12 agents working on it here in d.c.. >> i wanted to ask if the scope of the investigation includes looking into whether individuals have been

politically targeted. i can tell you we are hearing more and more anecdotal reports, not just a tea party and conservative groups that were delayed and targeted, but donors who supported governor romney in the campaign, who supported republicans, who found within weeks or months of their support becoming public suddenly they were targeted for audits. those are very difficult questions to answer, if there is a pattern of doing so, because those audits are not generally public. do you know if the scope has included whether there was targeting of individuals for political activity by the irs? >> because it is an ongoing investigation i am wary about delving into what happened to the course of the investigation. i can assure you we will push it wherever it goes >> i would certainly urge the fbi not to

narrowly circumscribed the scope. because the last time there was an instance of an administration trying to use the irs to target political enemies it was the nixon administration and its lead to grave consequences. i think the fbi is well situated to pursue a serious impartial, fair, and yet vigorous investigation of whatever the scope of conduct and illegal conduct may have been. >> i want to talk about a second topic briefly, which is i am concerned that this administration and's priorities and of the war on terror have been misallocated. on the one hand the administration has been less than vigorous in protecting the civil liberties and constitutional rights of law- abiding citizens. on the other hand the administration has been less

than effective in investigating and going after real-life terrorist. particular i have is that your efforts or those of the fbi have been unduly constrained and handcuffed. i would point to two instances. one is the fort hood shooting where we have considerable evidence, including his e-mails, talking about killing other service members. the fbi was aware of that and yet we failed to stop that terrorist attack. likewise with the boston bombing, we had considerable evidence with the brothers of their affiliation with radical, islamic views, their advocacy of those views. we have reports from russia and yet we failed to stop that

attack. in your views, why is it the law enforcement was not able to connect the dots with fort hood and boston and prevent those attacks before hand? changed policies have under the obama administration concerning the investigation of radical islamic terrorism? >> neither case would it be good. there were policies that inhibited us from doing our job. i will tell you in the fort hood case, prior to the time of fort hood. -- prior to the time of fort hood, he was seen as a radical -- but was not known to engage in operational activities. consequently when we looked at e-mails we did not look them to the operational prison.

had we done so perhaps other steps would have been taken. there are judgment calls that were made in the course of that. in retrospect it could have gone the other way. i do not think there are any constraints, statutory or otherwise that enabled us or disabled us from doing the job. in the case of boston, yes we were alerted by the russians to their movement towards radicalization with the expectations from the russians. they wanted to alert us and to .he best investigation we could we did investigation based on what the russians gave us. that investigation required

going over all of the databases, went to the university for a period of time. he did his parents, interviewed him. -- interviewed his parents, interviewed him. he then goes back to russia and when he comes back what we did not do, which we are going to do in the future, text alerts come into the task force have to be identified to a particular person as opposed to just coming into a task force. in any event there is nothing that can strain our investigation at the offset back in 2011. in my mind, even if we had done the one or two things in retrospect we could have done better, i do not think we would have been able to stop that particular attack. i do not believe we were in any way constrained from doing the investigation that we thought was necessary once we had the information. >> thank you.

franken, your timing is perfect. you are next in order. you, i apologize. i was at 80 committee hearing. not ask things that have been asked before. the staff tells me that my questions are still relevant. first of all i just want to thank you for your service. i believe our country is a safer place because of your steady leadership. you will be missed. ofike to turn to the subject the surveillance programs my other colleagues have been discussing it. i believe the government must

give proper weight to the of keeping americans safe from terrorist and protecting americans privacies and part of sure that there is enough transparency so that americans understand the protections that are in place. based on the briefings received i believe these programs include a reasonable safeguards. i believe the government needs to be more transparent with the american people about these programs. i think the american people have the right to know what is going on. to the extent that is consistent with national security. i believe the government can and should provide that information in a way that does not compromise our security.

you think that the government could be more transparent to the american public about these surveillance programs in a way that is consistent with national security? >> the first level is transparency on to the government and transparency on to the fis accord. briefings i think there was transparency to those elements. when you talk about transparency to the american public you are going to give up something. you are going to be giving signals to our adversaries as to what our capabilities are. the more specific you did about the program and the more specific about the oversight the more specific you get about the capabilities and successes. to that extent you have people sitting around saying now i understand what can be done with our numbers in yemen and in the united states and consequently i am going to find another way to

communicate. i am going to keep that in my mind. there is a price to be paid for that transparency. where that line is drawn in terms of identifying what our capabilities are is out of our hands. you tell us to do it one way we will do it that way. there is a price to be paid for that transparency. >> and that is the question. in order to these programs you need the trust of the people. whenurse this all changes there is a disclosure like there has been and that is why we obviously have seen the the nsa being more forthcoming with that kind of transparency that i have been asking for. i want ask you specifically about section of 215, the authority and a tree at that authorizes the collection of telephone me to data. only the fbi has the authority

to request business records under section 215. not the director of national intelligence or the attorney general, but the director of the fbi. last week director clapper declassified the fact that the telephone me to data can be queried only when there is a reasonable suspicion and based on the facts of a predictor of basis of the cree is assisted with foreign terrorist organizations. he also declassify the fact that in 2012 this database was searched only 300 times. this is the kind of information that i think the american public benefits from knowing. that can build for the trust between the public and the governments. that kind oft information would be compromising for the disclosure?

>> apparently think it would be educating his our adversaries what our capabilities are. the specificity that you have to with the leak. it was such a small sliver of information on a particular program. the league does not talk about the oversight. it does not talk about all of the legal constraints in terms of how our program operates. one has to respond. there have to be responsive transparency in this particular instance. generally, and out. ourducates the person about capabilities and makes it that much harder to prevent the next terrorist attack. i'll tell you that inevitably communications are the soft underbelly of the terrorist. they have to communicate and the extent to which we can intercept the communications, to that extent we can prevent terrorist attacks.

if we are black than we are going to be sitting waiting for the next one without the tools we need to prevent that attack. .> i understand let me ask a similar question. i co-sponsored bipartisan legislation consistent with national security. i am asking you your judgment on this. the court opinions in determining key provisions in the patriot act and the fis the intelligence surveillance act, i think what is hard here is that it is hard for americans to debate the merits of a law when the law is kind of secret. you believe that the american people would regain the trust and benefit from a productive

persian -- a redacted version of these decisions and opinions as a court? >> let me start by saying i understand the frustration. you are right, the american people are frustrated. you may be frustrated in having read it in not having access to those opinions. are looking at the possibility of releasing i spoke oflawyer and today and indicated they are releasing key opinions with regard to 15 and 702. they're seeing what the that can be accomplished. i have to refer to the dot on that. >> that is on the context of them being already disclosed. >> i do not think >> the

opinions have not been disclosed. >> yes. >> thank you again. since this may be the last time since he testified before as i want to thank you for your steadfastness and service. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman and thank you for your service to our country. section 215 of the patriot act, is it the bureau's practice to request records or other tangible things related to americans that they themselves are not relevant to an investigation? to obtain foreign intelligence information in order to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities? >> i am not sure i understand the question. we are the applicants on the 215

orders. when you make the application is it your practice to request things that aren't relevant to the investigation? in other words you confine your requests to those things that are related to an investigation or are they broader than that? >> in the 215 context, the application for the court and definest's finding relevance in that particular context. as we talked about and has been discussed in the last two weeks i would have to direct you to the orders and i know they're not published but the fact that the fis the court has ruled that the gathering of the make the data satisfied the relevant definition --

thatth that understanding you necessarily to cover a lot of data that is not closely tied to an investigation, you can understand why a lot of people would be concerned and why they would have additional concerns that we kept not only secret data gathering activities going on but also they are undertaken pursuant to secret law, secret orders that the american people cannot have access to. if as we have been told it is necessary for the government to collect and store really vast quantities of information, including information on americans that is itself an unrelated to foreign intelligence or terrorism investigations, if i may, are you talking about the may to meta data? >> yes.

people have concerned as to what limits in principles there are that would prevent the government from ultimately storing all information about all americans, mean just collecting more and more of this data and holding it for a very long periods of time or perhaps in perpetuity. does the department of justice or does the fbi have a view on the constitutionality of gathering information on americans and storing it so long that it does not perform queries on that information? >> i think i understand the broader question. i would say that the justice department believes that the program in place that has been ups held is certainly constitutional. i would limited to that set of facts because the discrete set --facts with the attendant with the intended protections on privacy, they believe is constitutional. >> at some point you sympathize

with those the was a that even though this is missing data, the fact you to collect that quantity of data and stored for a long time, the fact it can be is an intrusion on privacy. even if it is not caught miscible in court. >> as you know better than most it is not protected by the fourth amendment. without question there are privacy concerns. i would say there are minimus privacy concerns compared to every other intrusion as to get more provocation and investigation. in fact it is done at the bottom level. to think that it would be concerning to people to know there is this database? absolutely. which is why i believe it is important that this is upheld by not just the department of justice, not necessarily just by the inspector general, but also by the fis a court and congress.

important to remember that the president decided is decades old and it did not deal with the sheer volume of make to the debt that we are not talking about, the technologies that are at issue now did not exist them, certainly weren't even contemplated them. the more you aggregate large quantities of mitt to data, potentially on every single american citizen and to give some within the executive branch of government the power to search all of that, you to give them a pretty broad view into the lives of the american people. the more data you get, the more you add to that medicaid cuts, even any one of those datapoint might be constitutionally insignificant. don't you think you start to approximate a point in which you start to breach a regional -- a reasonable expectation of privacy. >> that probably is to scale.

it is the same dialogue we had 30 years ago about telephone toll records, which triggered the maryland case. it is the same debate, albeit with better data. we have pretty much the same piece of data in both cases. i would argue that even though it is not exactly the same, the proposition by the supreme court is comparable to date. >> we have comparable data. >> to we have the capacity to gather, analyze, and store in perpetuity that kind of meant to data on every single american citizen? >> it would have been tremendously burdensome to do so at that point. one of the differences today compared to 20 years ago is that

it was in the telephone company's interest to maintain a telephone toll data because they're billing was based on telephone poll data. today that is no longer the case. in fact the telephone companies see it as a burden and consequently that information that was there 20 years ago may well not be there today. absent 2015. -- absent 215. >> i see my time is expired. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator? >> thank you mr. chairman. i join my colleagues in thanking you for your service. i extend my aloha to you and your future endeavors. i appreciate the fact that this kind of data, this collective could be of helpful in connecting the dots. it is hard to figure out which bought might be the critical bought that helps you foiled a

plot. i have a question, to the best of your knowledge what is the cost of collecting and storing data gathered under sections two and five and 702? i think you have to turn to the nsa to respond to that question. i am not familiar with what it costs. >> what about your department? we do not do the storage. the nsa stores the 215 data. >> what about the collecting part? >> the collecting? it goes directly to the nsa. the order directs that the data goes to the nsa. >> while you are the applicants for the collection of this data, it is the nsa and ask about the boston attended to the data collection. do you know how long the data collection under the 215 is capt.? >> five years. >> do you think it should be longer? >> no. i also did not think it should

be shorter. your department's purview is prosecutions in indian countries. you talked about that briefly in your testimony. the department of justice recently issued a report on investigations and prosecutions during 2011 and 2012. this is a report mandated by the tribal law and order act of 2010. while there has been a noticeable increase in the number of violent crimes prosecuted, two new figures do not reflect that one-third of were closed crimes administratively by the fbi before they ever reached a formal referral stage. were 80% of those investigations were violent crime related. can you shed some light on the reason why so many fbi and

indian country investigations are closed before referral to doj and specifically ways in which your department can better address and investigate violent crime in indian countries. it is still a very big problem. >> it is a very big problem. i know the department of justice and particularly the deputy attorney general's, this is one of their substantial priorities, which is why you see an increase in prosecutions in the indian country. i will have to get back to on the figures relating to administrative closures. i am not certain if there has been enough in the number of administrative closures and why that is there. it may be consistent with the fact that we have done additional prosecutions and with additional prosecutions there is additional scrutiny of the underlying case which has resulted in administrative closures. so i might be just speculating. i would have to get back to after looking at the issue. >> considering this is a major

issue in indian country is and to realize that in this report so many of these cases are closed, i am curious to know why. could you provide that information to our committee? feinstein had a concern about the use of drones and particularly with regard to the use of drones' by the private sector. do we have any specific legislation regarding the use of drones by the private-sector? >> i am not aware of any. >> do you think we should be thinking about federal legislation to protect privacy? >> there are a number of issues related to drones that will have to be drawn -- that will have to be debated. not least of which, the drugs in

aerospace. we already have to a certain extent a body of law that relates to aerial surveillance and privacy. think it well could be butted to the use of drones it is still in stages of debate. debate andy of perhaps legislation down the road. >> especially the hearing we had in one of our committees, i think it was this one. the drones can be very tiny but store a lot of data and there could be cameras on it and -- i think this is a burgeoning concern for many of us. with regard to the data collected under section 205, in particular the millions of pieces of information selected, the nsa indicated there were 300 queries made with regard to this data. they have to forward the most

queries to you. cases are referred to you? >> they refer them to us when they have a u.s. number that comes out of the query. >> having some difficulty understanding what the process is, what nsa does with all this information, where you come in. there is some next this between the nsa looking at this data, 300 queries, and forwarding to you 10 to 12 cases where they see some further investigation. what happens to all these other cases that, other numbers that were queried by nsa? >> these are cases where the identification of a number led to a terrorist case or corroborated other information

we had in a terrorist case. if you have nsa on a number in yemen, for instance, and they want to know who from the united states is in contact with that number, you have that number and they run it against the database of numbers to see whether there is any number in the united dates that has contacted that number in yemen. when that number comes out, we mention a couple examples, to san diego, they referred to us and say there is a number in san diego that is in contact with this number in yemen that is terrorist-related. we then get a national security letter to determine who has that number. who is the subscriber to that number? when we get the subscriber, we will build the investigation. that is the simplified form of

what the process is about. absent that capability, we would never identify that person in san diego who is in contact the terrorist group in yemen. that is what we did not pick up in 2001. and -- the intelligence community was on a number in yemen and the individual ended up being in the united states and, had we had that program in place we might well have picked up on it. >> so in your view, in spite of the fact that there are literally billions of pieces of information collected, in your view the dot connecting possibilities justify this kind of breadth of data collection? >> given all the precautions, all the constraints on the program, given the oversight of the program, yes. but it is the program as a whole, not just the fact of the

chelation of the records. how it is handled and what kind of information comes from it. i was asked earlier today, why did we miss boston? why did we miss ford hood? there can be one piece of information that comes out of it that would prevent the attack. people will say we were not sufficiently attentive to the e-mail traffic. had we been, we would have stopped fort hood. to the extent that this provides dots for us to connect it is very useful. you never know which dot is going to be the one that breaks the case. to the extent you remove the dots me playing field, we do not have the dots to connect.

>> i certainly understand that. thank you, mr. chairman. >> senator flake. >> thank you. i once act of the sentiments of my colleagues and thanking you for your long, dedicated service area and i was fortunate to be on the judiciary committee of the house and we had interactions there. i enjoyed the associations we have had. i appreciate that. i feel kind of like i grew up with 10 brothers and sisters. when the dessert plate was passed around and you're the last one and all the dessert is gone. in this case, all the questions have been asked. and, to your credit, answered. i have questions with regard to the information held in how long, but you pretty much answered those. there was one thing i still wanted to ask with regard to -- this 215 has been around since 2000 one in some fashion? >> probably 2002. in its fashion since 2007. >> how has the legal interpretation, internal interpretation you rely on in your own memos to produce and interpret 215, what you are able to ask and what standard applies, has that changed over

time since 2007? >> prior -- i am not certain what year it happened, but it was placed within the fisa court beginning in 2007. the justice department has made applications to the fisa court. the fisa court has interpreted 2152 interpret this program. it is not just what they think 215 means. the fisa court has issued opinions saying this is the appropriate interpretation of 215. >> one question. you hold data for five years. if it has not been queried or minimized during that period, you get rid of it. but the nsa holds it. that which has been queried and duly minimzed where

appropriate, that can be queried again and again. it is the same information, basically, the same database, the same metadata queried again and again. >> but the database is refreshed each day. that which is five years old is a race. >> a rolling five-year period. >> it enables us to go back. called,have a number for instance, out of san diego made the call to yemen in i think earlier in 2000. so you needed that number in that database from a year before in order to tie in that particular number to the terrorist number in yemen. so it gives us that database

for a period of time that has the relevant information in us. if you go to one of the providers, they may keep the data for 12 months, 18 months, something along those lines. you would not be able to get the same data from the telephone carriers because they have no data retention possibilities, as you would get when we have that database. >> thank you. in conclusion, your service will end sometime in september? >> yes. >> what advice would you give to this body in terms of what changes are needed moving forward and how we handle situations like this. obviously, this is -- this came as a shock to most of the country that this data was being collected. in terms, you have concerns,

and i share them, about too much information being out there. but what is the proper balance for this body to inform or keep citizens aware enough that their rights and their civil liberties are protected but they are also giving the appropriate agencies the tools they need to thwart attacks? any advice you would give that you have not given before? >> the only thing i would say is that there are levels of transparency in a particular case. it is not always the case -- not only the department of justice and inspector generals, we had inspector general reports on these programs. but the fisa court and congress.

to the extent that each of those entities are brought in the loop and understand or are able to question to a certain extent, assuring these entities have coverage, the american public can put faith in these institutions. you are always going to have those areas of classified areas where it does not make any difference whether it is the cyber arena or the military arena or the intelligence arena like this. where disclosing our secrets will make us that much more vulnerable. there will always be a level of frustration. the only other thing i say is that there will be additional terrorist attacks. one of the most debilitating things for those of us in this position is to try your darndest to prevent there being

an attack, and then when you are immediately attacked, why didn't you do more? we'll is believed, regardless of the attack, that it is incumbent upon us and others to come back and do a scrub and see what we have done better. but the way that you do it would be helpful to those of us who worry about this day and night. >> thank you. thank you for your service. senator durbin. >> thank you. thank you so much for your service. i enjoyed working with you over the years. i recall in particular when you arrived at the fbi after 9/11, and i took note of the fact that the computer system at the premier investigative agency for law enforcement in united states of america on 9/11 was as archaic as anything anyone could imagine. the computer system you inherited at cfb i had no had no-- at the fbi

access to the internet, had no word search capability, and was unable to transmit materials and documents. the photographs of suspected terrorists were sent to fbi offices by overnight mail because they could not be sent by the computer system you inherited. we had many conversations, some missteps. tommy today, where are we 12 years later in terms of the computer system of your agency? >> in terms of the computer systems -- we have a computer system that has been operative the last two years. it is cutting edge in terms of case management. many of our other programs, we have not only upgraded but are now incorporating in a much more effective network. i will tell you, it was one of the most frustrating aspects of this job, trying to adapt new

technology in institution that has the unique business practices, and to try to modify those business practices at the same time and upgrade the business practices at the same time you are trying to adopt new technology. particularly with the contracting mechanisms within the federal government where if you have a five-year can't track -- contract, things will change, new technologies will come along. the fact of the matter is that there's is little room in the contracts without any ability to change. i remembered being in the intelligence operations room in september 11. in boston we were back in the same place.

there's not a piece of of paper to be seen. to the credit of the bureau, the ability to identify those within 48s in boston hours after it occurred, utilizing the various technologies in the laboratory as well as of their is testimony to the the fact that we have come a long way. >> in addition to bringing integrity to the testimony, i think youre, legacy will include this. is meeting 21st- century standards. when you inherited it, it was a creation of "unique business practices." >> can i add one thing? we are ok today but technology

cost money. we see this on another plug. getsall too often overlooked and cuts. it should not be. you should not run this unless you stay current with the latest technology. is a pervasiven problem. i met yesterday with the direct to her. he about the impact of checksration on doing on employees for security clearances. we have had to reduce the number of check of the current employees when it comes to security. now we are dealing with one former contractual employee hugh .as disclosed things speaking of that issue, on i have offered an amendment over the years to try to limit the metadata collection in terms of specific suspicion.

the original standard. it was eventually changed with the fisa reauthorization. yesterday, the department of theice released publicly standards for searching the database of phone records when there is "reasonable sicily -- on articulated facts that the information sought is associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization yuriko the of."ard -- organization the standard they released yesterday is stricter than the i have been using. can section 215 be revised to require a connection to a suspected terrorist without affecting the ability to obtain useful information? >> i'm a little bit confused. the telephone number that has

run against the database has to as meeting the reasonable suspicion standards with regard to terrorist attacks. that particular phone number. you cannot pick a phone number out of the blue. you have to have it tied into terrorism and then it is pushed into the database. i do not know whether your standard is the standard you apply to collection of the records or the standard you apply to identifying the selector against the data which you will put against the database. >> our standard is on the collection of records. that is a little bit different. the standard here is the identification of the select or that you are going to run.

>> if the telephone provider were to retain the records for five years, and you would have access to access those records for government purposes if there meetsuspicion, with that the needs of collecting the information to keep us safe? samenot -- >> that in the way as they do now. you would have to go to a number of telephone companies. you'd have to go to a number of companies and get legal process. then you have to hope they have some record capability of retention. it will not be five years. >> not today. >> it could be required of them though. >> it could be. you are asking me if there's is a distinction between the programmer and today and how you -- toed to amendment

admit it. there is a downside. for the time it would take for them to get it and time is of the effort that's -- time is of the essence. >> we have been very patient with your time. i thank you for your service. i wish you the best. -- i and yourlast last. it is good to see you. three topics i want to talk on. the first has to do with the investigation into the conduct of the irs. the background to this is that the tax laws allow you to form up as a charity under section 501(c)(3) but if you want to lobby you have to form up under 501(c) fou(4).

if you want to election there you have to form a super pac. the difference between a 501(c) (4) and a super pack is that a super pack is required to disclose to donors. oft developed was a pattern (4) andling as a 501(c) then going out and electioneering as if they were a super pack. the problem with doing that is that there is a place on the form when you file for a 501(c) (4) that requires you to assert oath that you will not seek to influence elections and so forth. we had a hearing on this and the committee.

it appears to me to almost be a false statement violations. based on what appear on their surface. requires investigation before any final determination. it appears these are flagrantly false statement made under oath to a government agency for the purpose of misrepresenting the attentions of those forming the 501(c)(4). that never comes to the fbi. there is an agreement between the department of justice and irs hasthat unless the put a case together we are not going to look at it. the applicants are taking advantage of that and the irs was feeling a bit intimidated because there were some very powerful people on both sides of the aisle behind the problem.

i hope that as you are looking at the irs question part of what you are looking at is whether or that we know is a plain-vanilla prosecutors and is something that the fbi should irs away from because the has not yet referred it when it is out in the same light of day. i hope you will consider that question as the investigation moves forward. it may not be the type of question that leads to a charge. in may not be purely investigative. it is an important policy question. when people are doing something to beppears on its face, a flagrant false statements, does not refer to us in the

whit right way. it is not a convincing answer for what appears to be a fairly latent criminal act. i would like to ask your comment on that, if that is something that you will consider as part of how you look at those. >> i'm not familiar with any type of agreements. >> will make that for the record and you can get back to me. >> we met recently with some of your folk. we met to try to figure out how resources should be structured to focus on the cyber problem. i have watched that administrative structure almost every year to some a new, something different.

i have been out to some of your facilities. i applaud and am impressed by how hard the at the iwork to top track of who is -- works keep track of our companies and trying to get those alerts out as quickly as they can to the company's that are being attacked in having their intellectual property being stolen. it has not resulted in a lot of prosecutions. not at i know, there is single case that has ever been prosecuted of a pure industrial espionage cybersecurity attack from outside the country on an american company. there has always been something involved. i'm not aware of a case that has been made yet. it is a question i asked frequently. i think this is a boom area. i am pleased that the

government is investing more in at the department of defense and other places. it is a huge vulnerability. your way out. on i hope one of your departing messages will be we need to keep looking forward to see what our structure should be to take on the years ahead. i do not think we aren't there yet. i think we have made immense progress. we are in a state of constant flux. when you look at a problem that is described by senior as us being on the losing end of the biggest transfer of wealth by illicit means in human history because the chinese are raising our corporations and stealing our

intellectual property, that is serious. that is only going to get worse. i hope that you have an open and what this looks like down the road. how should this be structured so we are really out of it? what is the structure this should look at down the road? such a greating job. it is hard to pop your head up andof a day-to-day fight the plan ahead. that would be a good legacy for you to leave. this should be like five or 10 years from now. >> everybody knows the focus has been on cyber. we have to put our own house in

order first. we are not there yet. organizationspt that lend itself to more specificity to particular lies -- particular rise threats. we now have the counterintelligence. they are like that. structuresational more of a threat-based organizational structure. one of the focal point outside my firm belief that for us to be successful we have to have will at the table right at the outset and socialne whether it is security or criminal. you need all the information on

the table. there may be something up there that will help you on a criminal matter. they have the relevant players working. lastly with the private sector. this is a location with the exception of the nsa. relatively us can be co-located. you need the relationships to come together and equip themselves to share information and set of conduits between the private sector and the federal government that will ensure privacy and in able to share information and ways we have not had to in the past. we have a way to go.

i can tell you with my successor -- there will be some discussions on this. >> we have a dress this a little bit. i do think that we over classify. it is much easier to classify then is to declassify. there are a whole variety of for classifying programs and materials. it seems to me that a lot of the stuff that has been said about the programs and the support of them could have been said before him without compromising it without any significant respect. particularly the multiple checks and balances.

both houses of congress are being briefed in on programs like this. inspectors general being ly accountable for these. there is the rigor and frequency of the audit that is done for those programs. the fact that regular united states district court judges are brought in on detail to serve on offcourt, they have to sign on these programs. of have a strong array systems under this government as one could possibly create. i do not know that a single unturned been left and making sure these programs were carefully used and never

abused. story is one that does not hurt us to get out first. before this incident people knew there were ways in which we were protecting ourselves. we could have said generally that when we look into programs affected americans privacy we go all in and making sure there are not shortcuts and that qualified people get at. the lesson from this going forward is that as much as interest and of a lot of this information, there's also public information and he classifying it. nationalexactly zero security risk. bunch ofept up with a other stuff because the program was classifies. sensors are not de-classifiers.

this has never been used in the history of the senate intelligence committee. i am speaking through you now into a whole lot of other people. more persistent focus on what could be declassified and what would help for these foreseeable events of disclosure would be a good policy to pursue. your thoughts? >> i do believe there is a price to be paid. we think they know and understand the internet around the world. that do notple understand the full understanding of the internet. to the extent you expose these, we are educate them. --are educated thing educating them about how the world works and what our capabilities are. to findl be educated other ways to communicate.

this is not to say that the scale should not be on the other side. it is much easier to explain to thepublic may do not have restrictions of classification. i do think there is a price to be paid. i would not underestimate the price to be paid by a substantial disclosure. >> i agree. i think we have to be very sensitive to that. when we are telling the american people we will not raise the question of what we're doing, here are the procedures we use. you would never tell anybody about an ongoing investigation. we tell everybody about the warrant requirement, about

minimization, about things that protect american security. let me thank you very much. you have been a terrific direct jerk of the federal bureau of investigation. before that you were a terrific member of the department of justice and a terrific united states attorney. you have made an awful lot of people proud. we are glad to have worked with you. >> it is you that makes the place run. thank you. >> thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2013]

>> the record can be open for week if anyone wishes to add material. effort2013 congressional with updated listings of each member of the house and senate, contact information and committee assignments. it has information about cabinet members. you can order one online at www.c-span.org/shop. this is at of ways challenging time for people who are conservatives. we have not only a democratic president but a quite liberal democratic residence who has not only been elected but reelected after putting into play some projects programs some that are wrongheaded. the public did reelect him. it is a challenging time. time if whatting

you are trying to do is modernize the conservatism. we help conservatives and therefore the country think about how to come from the challenges. this.r side is doing there is a lot of opportunity thinking about what americans need to change about the way it governs itself to get that economic growth and get back to prosperity and a kind of culturally viable we need. it is challenging but exciting. >> sunday at 8:00. the house debate a bill banning late-term abortions after 20 weeks. 28 chamber passed this to -- 196. this is about one hour and 20 minutes.

>> i ask consent that the woman from tennessee be permitted to control the balance of my time. >> lady from california is recognized. the right to object. i am wondering why a member of the judiciary committee is not managing on the part of the majority. the chairman is here. we recessed our markup so that all members of the judiciary committee could be present. it is generally our practice for members of the committee to manage on both sides. why are we departing from that practice? i do reserve.

>> i do seek recognition. >> only to say that is is the prerogative of the committee to choose the appropriate people to manage your time. i noticed the ranking member is not managing on the democratic side. >> i will not object. i just thought it was an unusual procedure. i will withdraw my reservation. withdrawhe gentlelady her reservation? >> i do. >> so order.